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1 Introduction
In this article we dene statistical criteria for determining competitive behaviour
from the long-run decomposition of prices If a market is e¢ cient then arbitrage
should eliminate misspricing. Regulatory authorities and rms have exploited
tests of stationarity and cointegration to attempt to determine non-competitive
behaviour (Forni, 2004, London Economics, 2002). Here, tests for stationary
relative prices are seen as a special case of cointegration. When market prices
are su¢ ciently inter-related in the long-run via cointegration, then the market is
viewed as having a broad denition or being more competitive. It follows from
arbitrage in the long-run that prices should reect misspricing or the demand
and supply shocks across a market.
Here, we generalize the approach outlined by Hendry and Juselius (2001) to
the case of multi-product price comparisons for a competitive market with n
commodities. It is assumed that all prices are integrated of the same order. In
the bivariate case competitive behaviour can often be seen as being consistent
with parallel pricing (Buccirossi, 2006 and Forni, 2004) and this proposition
might be appropriately tested by determining whether in their natural logarithm
(log) price proportions are stationary. Here, n price responses are consistent with
competitive behaviour when all prices are (I(1)), there are n-1 cointegrating
relationships or a single common trend, and the common trend is driven by a
combination of shocks to all n prices. The test of cointegration is a primary test
of the proposition that all series are driven by a single common trend and thus
a weighted average of the price shocks of all rms, but in the multiproduct case
this does not imply parallel pricing (Buccirossi, 2006).
Pure parallel pricing only arises when n -1 prices respond to a single price
and this price is then weakly exogenous for the vector of cointegrating rela-
tionships (Johansen, 1992). In the latter case the price set by one rm denes
a stochastic trend and all rms respond to the prices set by that rm. The
price that is weakly exogenous responds only to past values of that price and
more particularly to the shocks that apply to that rms price. In this article,
the common stochastic trend is not restricted to being generated in the above
manner.
in the next section Long-run Equilibrium Price Targeting (LEPT) is dened,
followed by a discussion of generic and empirical identication of the cointe-
grating vectors, then the e¤ect of weak exogeneity is considered and nally
conclusions are o¤ered.
2 The Stochastic Trend, Long-run Equilibrium
Price Targeting (LEPT) and Cointegration.
Consider a market consisting of n rms. These rms are viewed as being com-
petitive when they all respond to a single common stochastic trend, itself con-
sisting of a linear combination of the vector of shocks to individual rms (t).
This common trend we refer to as an Equilibrium Price Target (EPT) when
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each of the rms responds to it in the same way and the relationship between
each rms price and this trend denes a set of restrictions on the n   1 coin-
tegrating relations (), su¢ cient to exactly identify the n  (n   1) matrix of
cointegrating vectors, :1
Competitive rms are viewed as correcting their price behaviour in response
to some equilibrium price target. The underlying target to which the com-
petitive rm responds is a weighted average of the vector of all rms prices
x0t =

p1t ::: pnt

and for series that are all I(1) is dened by the non-
stationary component of a single common trend.
Let us consider the case where prices have a kth order Vector Error Correc-
tion form:
 (L)xt = 
0xt 1 + t
where  (L) = I  1L  2L2:::  k 1Lk 1 and we dene   =  (I  1  2::: 
 k 1):The following common trends denition of the equilibrium price target
derives from Theorem 4.2 in Johansen (1995) that gives rise to a cointegrating
rank of n  1.
Denition Let pt be:
pt = w
0xt = w0Cx0 + w0C(
tX
i=1
i + ) (1)
+ w0(0) 1
1X
i=0
(I + 0)i0(i + ):
Where the price weights are w0 =

w1 ::: wn

; C = ?(0? ?)
 10?;
0? = 0; 
0
? = 0; x0 are initial values and  is the drift. Then for pit  I(1);
8 i = 1;   n; Long-run Equilibrium Price Targeting(LEPT) implies that:
pit   pt  I(0):
A case of special interest is where the price weights sum to one (w0 = 1; 0 =
[1; :::; 1]) or prices are homogenous of degree zero. Then:
pit   pt = pit   w0xt
= (w0ji   w0)xt = w0(ji   In)xt:
Where ji is the transpose of the ith unit vector. When (ji  In) = Ri then there
are n cointegrating vectors of the form :i = w0(ji   In) that are dependent,
when all prices have the same order of integration.
1We use information that derives from the long-run inter-action of prices, because: we
believe that arbitrage is likely to require rms to respond to the forces of competition, and
this denes an informationaly e¢ cient starting point from which to detect anomalous pricing
behaviour. There are alternative measures of competitive behaviour (for example, Froeb and
Werden, 1998), but they are informationaly burdensome and sensitive to the nature of the
uncertainty (Hunter, Ioannidis, Iossa and Skerratt, 2001). This was rst proposed by Hunter
and Burke (2007).
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Here we consider a trivariate system2 with w0 =

w1 w2 w3

and:
0n =
24 :1:2
:3
35 =
24 w0R1w0R2
w0R3
35
=
24 w2 + w3  w2  w3 w1 w1 + w3  w3
 w1  w2 w1 + w2
35 ;
where
R1 =
24 0 0 01  1 0
1 0  1
35 ; R2 =
24  1 1 00 0 0
0 1  1
35 and R3 =
24  1 0 10  1 1
0 0 0
35 :
As rank(0n) < n we consider n  1 cointegrating vectors:
0 =

11 21 31
12 22 32

=

w2 + w3  w2  w3
 w1 w1 + w3  w3

:3
The system requires a nomalization to aid identication and the nding of par-
allel pricing may be sensitive to the normalization. Next identication is con-
sidered.
3 Empirical and Generic Identication
In general the unrestricted cointegrating relationships are not identied. First
generic identication is considered (Johansen, 1995) and this is followed by
empirical identication (Boswijk, 1996). This is often something ignored by
practitioners, but an order condition can be determined by comparison of the
restricted and unrestricted forms of ; and in the case of LEPT this gives rise
to:
r2 = (n  1)2 = (n  1)(n  2) + n  1; (2)
restrictions that are necessary and su¢ cient to identify : Firstly, economic
theory suggests n   1 = 2 price homogeneity restrictions4 that x the rst
column of 0:
11 + 21 + 31 = 0 and 12 + 22 + 32 = 0:
2The n variable case can be easily imputed from the trivariate case:
3 If one considers the inverse of

w2 + w3  w2
 w1 w1 + w3

and applies it to each of the
columns in 0; then this gives rise to 0 =

1 0  1
0 1  1

subject to an appropriate nor-
malization.
4Notice, that price homogeneity is a long-run property of LEPT. This means that in the
short-run agents may mistake relative and absolute price movements. However, long-run
pricing that does not satisfy this property would not appear to be consistent with competitive
behaviour.
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Secondly there are (n  1)(n  2) = 2 restrictions that x n  2 = 1 elements in
the remaining n  1 = 2 rows:
31   32 = 0 and 22   21   1 = 0:
Generic identication (see Burke and Hunter, 2005, Chapter 5) follows, because
LEPT imposes just enough restrictions to satisfy the order condition (2). Now
the formulae above can be used to solve r2 = 4 equations in terms of n  1 = 2
identied parameters:
32 = 31 =  w3
22 = 21 + 1 = 1  w2
11 =  21   31 = w2 + w3
12 =  22   32 =  21   1  31 = w2 + w3   1 =  w1:
Although, the above criterion are necessary and su¢ cient for generic identica-
tion, for empirical identication we require 21 6= 0 and 31 6= 0:
There are a number of di¤erent ways by which both  and  can be identied,
Burke and Hunter (2005) present a su¢ cient condition for the generic identi-
cation that is implicit in being able to solve for the structural parameters from
a long-run reduced form:
0 =

1 0 31
0 1 32

:
This parameterization of 0 is termed a Normalization Rule by Boswijk (1996)
and it also implies the imposition of r2 exactly identifying restrictions. Consider,
an orientation that operates on the rst two columns of 0 :
B1;2 =

w2 + w3  w2
 w1 w1 + w3

:
A necessary condition for the long-run reduced form to exist is:
det(B1;2) = det

w2 + w3  w2
 w1 w1 + w3

= (w1 + w2 + w3)w3 6= 0:
However, empirical identication according to Theorem 3 in Boswijk (1996)
implies that identication is not sensitive to the columns selected to generically
identify : This implies for the normalization associated with columns i and j:
0ij =

In 1 B 1i;j b 6=i;j

;
where In 1 is an n  1n  1 identity matrix and b 6=i;j the unrestricted vector
of parameters related to the remaining price. If b 6=i;j = 0; then one of the prices
is long-run excluded and for the case considered here this would contradict the
notion that all the series are I(1) as for r = n   1; 0ij =

In 1 0

and
therefore the remaining n  1 series are I(0):
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Hence for generic and empirical identication of 0 based on the normaliza-
tion rule of Boswijk, then in the trivariate case with i = 1 and j = 2; we require
an ordering that gives rise to:
det(B1;2) = det

11 21
12 22

= 1122   1221 6= 0
and
b 6=1;2 =

31
32

6= 0:
In our case empirical identication follows when 31 6= 0 and 12 6= 0 and this
is consistent with Theorem 2 and 3 in Boswijk (1996). Firstly, when 31 6= 0;
theorem 2 must hold as:
b06=12 =

31 32

=

31 31
 6= 0:
Secondly, Theorem 3 is satised when det(B1;1) = (w1 + w2 + w3)w3 6= 0 and
this is obtained from LEPT as w3 6= 0 when 31 6= 0 and (w1 + w2 + w3) =
 21   31 + 21 + 1 + 31 6= 0: It is important to point out that identication
may be sensitive to the ordering of the system and this may occur, because
the loadings on the common trend depend on the impact that shocks to that
company price have on the market. Further, LEPT can be linked back to a
number of normalized long-run reduced forms, but the restrictions that give
rise to LEPT do not apriori x the long-run to be:
0ij =

In 1  

:
More specically, when  = ij this implies two further over-identifying restric-
tions not required for LEPT to hold, though LEPT might imply them.
4 Common Trends, Competition and Exogene-
ity
Here, the notion of weak exogeneity is used to distinguish between market ine¢ -
ciencies, and a dominant market share and the pure arbitrage case. The notion
that weak exogeneity in a single price gives rise to a particular structure for
the stochastic trend is expressed for the VAR(1) case (see Hunter and Burke,
2007). In general, where one of the prices is weakly exogenous, then this drives
the stochastic trend (Kurita, 2008).
To draw out the key aspects of the concept, consider the special case of the
rst order VECM (k = 1) and w = ?; so that C = ?(0??)
 10?, 
0
? = 0:
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5 In the rst order VECM case when the initial conditions are removed empirically using
a procedure, such as that described by Taylor(1999), then the common trend is a weighted
average of the prices. More generally, this does not hold though the non-stationarity in the
price series is still driven by 0?(
tX
i=1
i):
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Now we can isolate the trend component by multiplying (1) by 0?: Therefore:
0?xt = 
0
?x0 + 
0
?(
tX
i=1
i + ) = 
0
?
tX
i=1
i;
when the initial condition is set to zero.
From the denition of LEPT, for a broad market6 all series must follow
the same order of integration otherwise di¤erent market segments may respond
to di¤erent trends as rank()  n   2: However, this type of relation is only
consistent with competitive behaviour when the cointegrating relations depend
on the shocks that impact on all the prices or we preclude the case where, by
any simple re-ordering, 0? =

0 0 3?

: More specically the identify-
ing cointegrating combination negates the possibility that n   1 prices depend
exactly on a single price; this is the case where one of the prices is long-run
weakly exogenous and n   1 prices react to the nth price. If there are n   1
cointegrating vectors and  is an n r matrix of loadings, then it follows from
Johansen (1992) that for WE of a variable for the parameters of interest ();
a row of  is set to zero. With rank() = n   1; then only one price can be
weakly exogenous as otherwise rank() = r < n  1 and there is more than one
common trend.
Now consider the case where there is a single common trend and a single
weakly exogenous variable and w = ?: As a result the following Theorem
applies.
Theorem rank() = rank() = n   1 and there exists 0 =  0n 1 0 
for some ordering of the pi; i = 1; :::n, that implies a broad market as all prices
interact, but there is non-competitive behaviour as pi for i = 1; :::; n   1 follow
pn:
Proof. In general, 0? =

1? 2? ::: n?

and the common trend
drives all prices:
pt = w
0xt = 0?xt = 
0
?x0 + 
0
?(
tX
i=1
i + ):
For WE 0 =

0n 1 0

; n 1 is an n   1  n   1 sub-matrix of loadings
and:
0? =

0 0 ::: n?

:
Therefore:

0 ::: n?
 264 p1t...
pnt
375 = n?pnt = n?pn0 + n?( tX
i=1
ni + n):
7
6The term broad market is used by Forni(2004) to consider cases where all prices in a
market or market segment interact.
7 In the case of the kth order VECM:
pt = w0xt = 0?xt = 
0
?x0 + e0?( tX
i=1
i + ) and e = 0??(0? ?) 1:
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In the trivariate case under the restrictions implied by LEPT:
0 =

3? 0  3?
0 3?  3?

and:
0xt =

3? 0  3?
0 3?  3?
24 p1tp2t
p3t
35 =  3?(p1t   p3t)
3?(p2t   p3t)

:
With price homogeneity, 0? = 1 and so 3? = 1: By induction for the n
variable case, pt = pnt and all prices are driven by the stochastic behaviour that
underlies pnt:
When all rms prices are conditioned on pnt; then rm n is the long-run
price leader and LEPT implies:
 =

In 1  n 1

and 0n 1 =

1    1  :
Therefore, we have a broad market in the sense that rms follow the common
trend, but when the common trend is driven by a single rm without reference to
other rms or more pertinently without reference to the direct shocks associated
with miss-pricing by these other rms, then the rm must hold a dominant
position in the market place or that rm must dene the barometer to which
all other rms respond. However, the notion of a barometric price implies that
reference must be made to the behaviour of all the other rms prices and so
the barometric case should not be distinguishable from the case of long-run
competitiveness
It follows, when one rms price (here rm n) is weakly exogenous for the
parameters of interest, that the nth rms price can be viewed as driving all the
other rms prices. This, we would argue is a form of price leadership as the
long-run is conditioned only on the behaviour of the nth rm price. In this
case, under the restrictions associated with LEPT all rms respond to those
of the nth rm, but in the long-run the nth rm does not respond to any of
the other rms prices. Hence, although there are n  1 long-run price relations
and  satises the restrictions associated with LEPT, this is not a competitive
case. Hence, for competitive behaviour, we have a further requirement that the
common trend is not dened by a single rms price or that none of the rms
prices are weakly exogenous for .
A number of side issues arise from rank() < n   1, there being at least
two common trends. Firstly, individual prices may follow linear combinations
of the common trends that happen to be di¤erent. In this case, one trend may
eventually come to dominate. Secondly, the market may be partitioned, so a
block of rms follow one price and another group responds to one or both prices.
A case of some interest arises when  is block triangular and this occurs when
we have cointegrating exogeneity (Hunter, 1990). This structure links nicely
with an earlier literature on Granger causality (LECg, 1999). If rms follow
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di¤erent linear combinations of the common trends, this may not be consistent
with equilibrium in the very long-run as such a divergence of prices is likely in
the end to lead to death or dominance.
5 Conclusion
In this article we considered the conditions required for competitive behaviour
using cointegration analysis. We argue that pricing is consistent with com-
petitive behaviour when: i) there are n   1 cointegrating relationships, ii) the
restrictions associated with LEPT are satised, iii) non of the price series are
WE. Beyond the bivariate case the restrictions associated with LEPT are not
in general simple price or log price di¤erentials often applied in the literature.
This has the implication that tests of stationarity applied to price di¤erentials
will not generally be appropriate when n > 2:
Here, the argument is driven by consideration of a single price, this may
be pertinent when a number of producers supply a fairly homogenous single
commodity, petrol or gas. When the multi-product nature of rm competition
is important, then we believe that this analysis can be extended to this case
via panel cointegration. We can also allow for shifting short-run dynamics in a
similar manner to Kurita and Nielsen (2009) and long memory processes with
fractional cointegration (Robinson, 2006).
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